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Stock market patterns around directors trades: effects of director category and gender on 
market timing 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine whether directors of UK companies can time the market when they trade in their 
own-company stock, using a comprehensive dataset on all directors’ trades from 1994-2006 for 
FTSE All Share companies and AIM-listed companies. We find that in the 20 days before a 
director’s buy (sell) trade prices fall (rise) such that abnormal returns are -2.48% (+2.17%); in 
the 20 days after a directors’ buy (sell) trade, abnormal returns are 1.55% (-1.19%). We go on 
to examine whether the category (executive or non-executive) and the gender (male or female) 
of the director differ in the information they posses about their own firms, how they trade on 
this information and how markets respond to their trades. We test both the information 
hierarchy hypothesis, that more senior corporate insiders have access to better information, and 
also a characteristics-based trading hypothesis, that the director’s trading pattern depends on 
the gender of the director. We find some support for the information hierarchy hypothesis, but 
no difference in the trading patterns and stock market response to directors’ gender differences, 
after conditioning on the category of director. 
 
Keywords:  Insider trading; director trading, gender 
JEL classification: G14 
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I. Introduction 
Modern corporate entities are characterized by a separation of ownership and control, and 
although managers’ compensation contracts may include stock incentives to align the interests 
of shareholders and managers (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1998; Murphy, 1999), this raises 
additional issues when a manager wants to trade in their own company stock. The concern 
relate to the likely informational asymmetry between the shareholders of the firm, and those 
managers in control of the day-to-day affairs of the firm, who are privy to private information. 
These information asymmetries may be exploited by corporate insiders to their own advantage 
and at the expense of other shareholders. There is ample evidence from Seyhun (1986), Jeng, 
Metrick and Zeckhauser. (2003), Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (1997), Friederich et al (2002), 
and Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) that insiders in UK and US companies do 
generate abnormal returns when they trade, and this ability of corporate insiders to trade 
profitably in their company’s shares raises concerns over fiduciary duty (Moore, 1990), fairness 
(Carlton and Fischel, 1983) and efficiency (Leland, 1992) of financial markets.1.  
 
In both the US and the UK post-Enron, regulatory concerns implemented through the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002 and the Higgs Report (2003) have emphasized the role of non-executive 
directors in monitoring the actions of executive directors. However this view of independent 
non-executive directors relies on these non-executives being different and separate from the 
executive directors. Fidrmuc et al (2006) test the information hierarchy hypothesis whereby the 
information content of a directors’ trade depends on the category of director making the trade, 
and find no evidence that returns from trading differ across categories of director. However in 
their study the four identified categories are: CEOs, Chairman, top-three executives, and other 
incumbent directors (mainly but not exclusively non-executives). They reject the hypothesis 
that different categories of directors have differential information. In the current paper, we re-
examine the information hierarchy hypothesis, but we focus on only two categories of 
directors: executive and non-executive, on the basis that this more natural classification 
                                                 
1 Although Lakonishok and Lee (2001) in examining insider trading in companies traded on the 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during the 1975-1995 period find only small stock price 
responses to the reporting announcement of the trade. 
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encompasses the idea that executive directors are involved in the day to day management of the 
company, and have access to more private information than non-executives.  
 
We also study the effect of gender differences on price patterns around directors trading. It is 
well known that most directors of companies are male, and in Exhibit 1 we report the Female 
FTSE Index which shows that for both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies there are an 
average of 11.3 and 8.4 directors per company, respectively, but that females are under-
represented.  Even more dramatically, females are more under-represented with respect to 
executive directorships over non-executive directorships. The ratio of male non-execs to execs 
is 1.77, but the ratio of female non-execs to execs is 4.8.  Hence any gender differences in 
directors’ trading, since females are over-represented as non-executive directors relative to 
executive positions, may contaminate the information hierarchy effect measured only with 
respect to the category of the director. We therefore examine Seyhun's (1986)  information 
hierarchy hypothesis conditioning on gender, since we note that a greater proportion of non-
executives than executive directors are female. Hence previous research that has not 
conditioned on these gender differences, may have erroneously attributed a lack of an 
information hierarchy effect, because of gender effects. Thus, this paper not only contributes to 
the literature on insider trading testing both the information hierarchy hypothesis, and a 
characteristics-based hypothesis of insider trading, but also to the literature in behavioural 
finance concerning gender biases in trading and investment decisions. 
 
We examine two aspects of price patterns around directors’ trades. First we examine whether 
the two-by-two classification by category (executive or non executive) and gender (male or 
female) affects the amount or quality of the information that directors posses. We posit that any 
informational differences will be reflected in the way that directors trade on their personal 
accounts and the returns they generate: insiders with more information should generate higher 
abnormal returns from their trades than other insiders. This informed trading is referred to as 
the ability to time the market. We will examine whether the directors’ category or gender 
matters when assessing the degree of market timing ability. 
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The second aspect of directors’ trading we consider is the extent of the stock market reaction to 
the transaction, and whether the response differs depending on the category or the gender of 
director who is trading. There is evidence that prices fall after a director’s sell transaction, and 
rise after a director’s buy transaction. In this context of our two-by-two classification we ask 
whether markets respond differently to an executive or a non-executive transaction and to a 
male or a female director’s trade. In other words, does the category or gender of the director 
who is trading matter in determining the market reaction to a director’s transaction?  
 
The results of this paper suggest that directors do possess market timing ability in that they buy 
after a run down in prices and sell after a run up in prices with reversals immediately following 
the trades. The market views directors’ purchases as a more credible signal about a firm’s 
future prospects than directors’ sell trades, and this may be because of the markets inability to 
distinguish between information driven sales and sales for other reasons. We analyze the post 
event CAARs in a regression framework after controlling for the size, value of shares traded, 
the number of shares traded as a percentage of holdings, multiple trade dummies and we find 
that the market reaction to a director’s trade is not influenced by the gender of the director but 
is affected by the category of the director trading. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an outline of the regulatory framework in 
the UK and Section III summarizes the literature on directors trading and develops the 
hypotheses to be tested in the current paper. Section IV describes the data and the methodology, 
and Section V presents the results. Section VI contains various robustness checks and section 
VII. Concludes. 
 
II. The regulatory framework and directors’ trades in the UK  
In a global examination of insider trading regulations, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) report 
that by the end of 1998, the vast majority of stock markets around the world had insider trading 
laws. The term insider trading entails the use by a trader of price sensitive information (known 
to the trader but not to the market as a whole) to trade a financial security to their advantage.  
Trading by corporate insiders may or may not be based on private information. Trading by 
corporate insiders is not prohibited in the UK provided the trading does not violate insider 
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trading restrictions. Insider trading in the UK is regulated by The Companies Act 1985, The 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Part V), The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the 
Listing Rules for publicly listed companies on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  
 
Under the Criminal Justice Act 1993 when a director has inside information acquired by virtue 
of his/her employment, office or profession, she is prohibited from dealing in any securities that 
are affected by that information. Inside information, broadly defined, is specific or precise 
information about particular securities or an issuer that has not been made public and would be 
likely to have a significant effect on the price of those securities if it were made public. 
Directors must also not disclose inside information, except in the proper performance of their 
job. Breach of the Criminal Justice Act is a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment or a 
fine or both. 
 
The Companies Act 1985 specifies that a director is obliged to disclose to the company any 
interests in its securities. They must notify the company of all changes in those interests and of 
dealings connected with them within five business days. The company must keep a register of 
the interests notified, which must be kept available for inspection. Under the Listing Rules for 
companies trading on the LSE, the company must notify a Regulatory Information Service 
(RIS) of interests and changes in those interests before the end of the next business day 
following receipt of the information from the director. Guidance for companies and directors is 
available in the Continuing Obligations Guide and the Price Sensitive Information Guide 
obtained from the Financial Services Authority (FSA). From 15 April 2002 a new mechanism 
for disseminating regulatory information became effective, allowing listed companies the 
choice of which Regulatory Information Service to use, to disclose their regulatory information 
to the market. These RIS providers include: Business Wire Regulatory Disclosure, Newslink 
Financial, PimsWire, PR Newswire Disclose, and the Regulatory News Service (RNS) 
provided by the London Stock Exchange. 
 
Listing rules also require that listed companies must have a code of dealing in securities that 
meets the minimum standards set out in the Model Code. Directors must not deal on 
considerations of a short-term nature; or during a two-month ‘close period’ before the 
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announcement or publication of the annual report, the half-yearly (or quarterly) results, or when 
the director is in possession of unpublished price-sensitive information about the company’s 
listed securities; or before receiving clearance from the company chairman or other designated 
director that the proposed dealing may proceed. The Model Code requirements are more 
extensive than the prohibitions on insider dealing in the Criminal Justice Act 1993. 
 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) provides the statutory framework for 
the new UK market abuse regime, which became effective on 1 December 2001. Under the 
market abuse regime introduced by the FSMA, the FSA can impose penalties on companies or 
individuals. These may comprise either an appropriate financial penalty or a public censure. 
The FSA may also apply to the court for injunctions or restitution orders in cases of market 
abuse. Market abuse is widely defined. It includes behaviour by a person in relation to 
securities traded on the LSE that amounts to misuse of information; creation of a false or 
misleading impression; or market distortions. 
 
III. Literature review and development of hypotheses 
Previous research by Seyhun (1986), Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2002), Hillier 
and Marshall (2002) and Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) have identified that 
corporate insiders time the market when they trade. Directors typically buy after a run down in 
share prices, and following the insider trade subsequent abnormal returns are positive. Similarly 
before an insider’s sell trade, pre-trade abnormal returns are positive, and share prices then fall 
after the trade. For example Friederich et al. (2002) using daily data analyse trades by UK 
directors in mid-cap companies from 1986-1994 and find annualized abnormal returns are a 
significantly negative -2.85% in the 20 days before a purchase, and then for the 20 days after 
the directors’ trade the abnormal returns are a significantly positive 1.96%. They also find that 
the price patterns are symmetrical for sells, although of smaller magnitude: pre-trade 20-day 
excess returns are 1.23% and the excess returns average -1.46% for 20 days after the event.  
Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) find similar results for directors’ trades in UK 
companies over the period 1991-1998, and also consider the impact of trade size on the 
CAARS. They find that for both large (trades of at least .01% of market cap) and small 
purchases, the trade is preceded by significantly negative CAARS (-1.27% and -2.18%) and for 
 8 
large and small sales (3.07% and 1.84%). They conclude that these figures confirm director’s 
market timing abilities.  
Seyhun (1986) also suggests an “information hierarchy” hypothesis, based on the idea that an 
insider’s position in the firm affects their access to information. He finds that stock prices are 
most responsive to the trades of CEOs, then other officers, and finally non-executive directors, 
and concludes that this supports the information hierarchy hypothesis. Jeng et al (2003) use a 
performance-evaluation methodology to estimate the returns earned by insiders when they trade 
their company's stock. They focus on the returns earned by insiders themselves and this differs 
from the previous event-study methodologies that focus on the informativeness of insider trades 
for other investors. They find that portfolios formed of stocks with insider purchases earn 
annualized abnormal returns of more than 6% per year, but portfolios based on insider sales do 
not earn significant abnormal returns. Jeng et al also test the information hierarchy hypothesis, 
and distinguishes between three categories of corporate insiders defined by job-title. The “Top-
executive” portfolio is formed from the trades of those corporate officers that hold the title of 
chief executive, chairman, or president. The “Other-officers” portfolio includes all corporate 
officers except for top executives. The third “Directors” portfolio are those non-executive 
members of the corporate board who do not also hold an officer title. They suggest transactions 
by top executives are scrutinized by shareholders and regulators, and this may reduce the 
incentive for the top executive to trade, and hence work against the information hierarchy 
hypothesis. They find that the portfolios based on the Other-officer-purchase and the Director-
purchase yield point estimates of the abnormal returns that are significant and of similar order 
of magnitude to the overall purchase portfolio results. In contrast to Seyhun (1986) they find 
insignificant returns on the top-executive purchase portfolios. However they note that the 
purchases of the top-executives tend to be twice as large as the other categories, and since they 
also find that abnormal returns to large purchases are no larger than the returns to medium-
sized trades, they are able to reconcile their results with Seyhun’s. 
Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) also test for an information hierarchy using the 
CAARS earned after the trades of the individual categories of directors and a multivariate 
analysis of the two-day CAR. They look at five categories: CEOs, other executive directors, 
chairman, other incumbent directors and former directors. However, they find no evidence of 
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information hierarchy for the current directors, as the CAARS for the various categories are not 
significantly different from each other. From the results of the multivariate regressions, they 
report that the coefficients for all the categories of directors are positive and significant. 
Interestingly, they find that the CEO purchases (2.5%) have the lowest market reaction 
compared to other officers (4.9%), and conclude that this contradicts the information hierarchy 
hypothesis. They explain their results as due to the fact that CEO transactions are closely 
monitored and therefore they trade at less informative times compared to other directors. Also, 
they say that the positive news could be negatively impacted by the fact that when they are 
purchasing they are also entrenching their positions within the firm, which the market sees as a 
bad news. They find that the sales transactions also do not lend any support to the information 
hierarchy hypothesis. 
In our work, in contrast to previous studies that have examined the information hierarchy effect 
by identifying multiple categories of directors and officers of the firm, we consider only the 
distinction between executive and non-executive members of the board of directors. This is 
because the many types of executive directors such as the CEO, Finance Director and 
Operations Director will have different functions within different firms. Bebchuk, Cremers and 
Peyer (2006) examine the share of CEO pay in all executives’ pay for US corporations, and 
find that this share varies across firms, suggesting that power within corporations is distributed 
across different executive roles: “CPS [CEO’s pay slice] might reflect the relative significance 
of the CEO in terms of abilities, contribution, or power” (p. 1). This work suggests that to test 
the information hierarchy hypothesis within the multiple categories of executive directors, one 
should first condition on the power of the executive within the corporation, possibly proxied by 
their pay slice. Alternatively, we hypothesize that executive directors as a category will have 
access to more information than non-executive directors, so that the information hypothesis can 
be examined with respect to the distinction between executive and non-executive directors. 
Recently there has been an increased awareness of the role of the non-executive directors in the 
management of company affairs, as their effectiveness had been criticized following the Enron 
and WorldCom scandals (Cheffins and Black, 2006) The literature looking at the relationship 
between board composition and firm performance has found no concrete evidence of 
independent directors improving firm’s performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Mehran 
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(1995), Klein (1998), Bhagat and Black (2002) all report insignificant relationships between 
accounting measures of performance and the fraction of independent directors on the board. 
Aggarwal and Williamson (2006) on the other hand find that the fraction of independent 
directors in the board has a positive impact on firm’s Q in the period between 2001 and 2005.  
Lin, Pope and Young (2003) examines the stock market reaction to the appointment of non-
executive directors (NEDs) in UK companies over the period 1993-1996, and finds that the 
impact of stock market returns depends on the extent of agency problems in the firm and on the 
monitoring abilities of the NEDs. In cases in which the agency problem is acute, the stock 
market reaction to the appointment of a NED is positive.  
 
In the UK, the Higgs Report looked at the role of the non-executive director, and as background 
for this report MORI carried out a survey of company directors.2 The survey found that, nearly 
two-thirds of non-executive directors have never received any training for their role (62%). Of 
those who have received training, four in five found it fairly or very useful (81%). The survey 
also found that most non-executive directors (81%) received some sort of briefing or induction 
when they started their role. But for many, this occurred either before they were appointed or 
was informal. Only a quarter received a formal induction after appointment (24%). A quarter of 
directors think that the largest barrier to the greater effectiveness of non-executive directors is 
their own lack of time or commitment to the company (25%). A lack of knowledge/ 
understanding of the company was cited by one in ten non-executive directors (10%) and one 
in five executive directors (19%). 
 
The Higgs Report recommended that “To be effective, non-executive directors need to be well-
informed about the company and the external environment in which it operates, with a strong 
command of issues relevant to the business. A non-executive director should insist on a 
comprehensive, formal and tailored induction.”3 On a more anecdotal note, concern on the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors is reflected in a letter by Warren Buffet to his 
                                                 
2 Interviews with random sample of 605 directors of UK listed companies were conducted by MORI Telephone 
Surveys (MTS) between 12 August and 18 September 2002. Quotas were set to achieve interviews with 75 
chairmen, 250executive directors and 275 non-executive directors and of FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and other listed 
companies to ensure that the survey sample was broadly representative. Available at http://www.ipsos-
mori.com/polls/2002/dti-higgs.shtml.  
 
3 See Annexure C- Guidance for non-executive directors- Higgs Report Page 97. 
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shareholders, where he comments on independent directors “These people, decent and 
intelligent though they were, simply did not know enough about business and/or care enough 
about shareholders to question foolish acquisitions or egregious compensation”4  
 
Executive directors typically perform operational and strategic functions and are full-time 
employees of the firm. While non-executives are not generally involved with the operations of 
the firm, they are mainly hired for their experience and expertise in specific areas to provide 
advice and objectivity. Many non-executives work part time and work on specific projects. In 
terms of the gender composition of corporate boards, though the numbers of women on boards 
have increased in the last decade, the corporate boardroom remains a predominantly male 
domain. We hypothesize that the executive directors have more or better quality of information 
than the non-executive directors and this will be reflected in the abnormal returns they generate 
from their trades and also in their market timing ability. Thus, in terms of the category of the 
director, the following hypothesis is stated 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Abnormal returns associated with corporate insider trades depend on the 
category of director making the trade: negative (positive) abnormal returns preceding 
purchases (sales) and the accompanying positive (negative) abnormal returns following 
purchases (sales) are larger in absolute value for executive directors than for non-executive 
directors. 
 
We have already identified in Exhibit 1 that although under-represented on corporate boards, a 
greater proportion of women are non-executive rather than executive directors. If women trade 
differently to men, and Barber and Odean, (2001) suggest that there are gender trading 
differences, it is potentially important to separate out a gender effect from an information 
hierarchy effect. We will now explore the issue of gender differences in directors’ trading 
patterns, with recourse to the behavioral finance and corporate governance literatures for 
predictions into these issues. We summarize the evidence over whether a directors’ individual 
characteristics (as proxied by gender) affect their ability to trade on their information (or indeed 
whether one type is better informed that the other) and how the market will respond to the 
signal. 
 
                                                 
4 http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf 
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There is evidence on gender barriers to senior management positions reported in Oakley (2000), 
and Li and Wearing (2002).  Cultural and behavioural factors can lead to females being 
disadvantaged in the managerial labour market: including stereotyping, tokenism and exclusion 
from networks. Heilman et al. (1989) finds that when male managers were asked to 
characterize the styles of female managers, they described female managers as less self-
confident, less analytical, and less consistent than male managers. Oakley (2000) notes that in 
the presence of skewed sex ratios, there is a tendency by the dominant groups to engage in 
boundary heightening behaviour by which they try to exclude less-dominant groups. Informal 
(old-boy) networks also have this exclusionary effect by which less powerful males and 
females are excluded from membership of the informal groups. These same arguments can be 
adapted to explain that, even if females are appointed to boards of directors in either an 
executive or non-executive capacity, they may face discrimination in accessing information.  
 
The Female FTSE Index and Report 20065 reports that for the FTSE 100 companies the total 
number of female directorships was 117 (10%) out of which there were 15 (4%) executive 
directors and 102 (14%) non-executive directors. The same figures for FTSE 250 firms was 
139 (6.6%), 29 (4%) and 110 (8%) also interestingly they find that for both FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 companies the average board size in companies with female directors was 
significantly larger than companies with an all-male board. It is possible that, given the small 
numbers of women on the board that gender barriers persist at board level, that may result in 
female directors being isolated and hence affecting the quantity or quality of the information 
they have about the firm.  
 
On the other hand, the female directors who have been appointed to a position on the Board are 
those who have proved themselves highly able. There is evidence that women directors are as 
equally qualified as their male counterpart in their professional background, decision-making 
competency, business and non-business directorships: Burke (2000), McGregor (2000), 
Sheridan and Milgate (2005) find that both men and women who become members of the board 
attribute their success to a strong track record, a good understanding of business principles and 
                                                 
5 This is the eighth report compiled by Professor Susasn Vinnicombe and Dr Val Singh and published by the Centre for 
Women Business Leaders, Cranfield University. 
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their business contacts. However, for women their credibility also needs to be supplemented by 
high visibility: they note that a women’s competence has to be widely acknowledged in the 
public domain, before nomination committees will consider a woman for a position on the 
board. Fondas (2000) as cited in Walt and Ingley (2003) concludes that boards with larger 
proportions of women are more likely to engage in power sharing and influence management 
decisions.  
 
Carter et al. (2003) examine the relationship between board diversity and firm value for 
Fortune 1000 firms and provides evidence of a significant positive relation between the 
proportion of women on the board of directors and firm value.  Shrader et al. (1997) however, 
find that there is a negative relationship between proportion of women on board and firm value. 
Lee (2007) looks at the stock price reaction to appointment of female CEOs and they find that 
the announcement of a new female CEO leads to a negative abnormal return of 3.7% over the 
announcement window, whereas a new male CEO leads to only a 0.5% decline in the stock 
price. They also find that this is less negative when the female directors have been promoted 
from within the company. They explain that this is because a firm insider provides information 
about the newcomer, other than gender, and signals to shareholders that the newly appointed 
CEO has the firm-specific knowledge and experience to lead the organization. Wolfers (2006) 
examines S&P 500 firms between 1992-2004 to test whether there are systematic differences in 
returns to stock of female-headed companies, they conclude with a caveat of low power of their 
tests, that the null hypothesis that long-run returns of male and female-headed firms are the 
same cannot be rejected. They conclude that their results show that the markets do not 
systematically over or underestimate the ability of female CEOs. With respect to the stock 
market reaction to directors’ trades, if the market considers female managers as less skilled and 
knowledgeable about the firm’s affairs, the market will not consider female director trades as 
an information revealing events, and stock price reaction will be muted.  
 
Studies in behavioral finance have considered various aspects of investors’ behaviour ranging 
from risk taking, trading patterns to ethical decision making. One major difference between 
men and women is their attitude to risk. Powell and Ansic (1997), Jianakoplos and Bernasek 
(1998), Schubert, Brown, Gysler, and Brachinger, (1999), Finucane et al. (2000) and Haleck 
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and Eisenhauer (2001) all present evidence that women are more risk averse than men in a 
number of financial decision making contexts. Bruce and Johnson (1994) find that men take 
larger risks than women do, although they do not find any evidence of differences in 
performance.  
 
A related gender-based aspect of individuals’ characteristics is overconfidence. Lenny (1977), 
Meehan et al. (1986), and Gervais and Odean (2001) find that men are generally more over-
confident in their own abilities than women. Barber and Odean (2001) test the overconfidence 
model using accounting data for over 35,000 households from a large discount brokerage to 
analyse the common stock investments of men and women from February 1991 through 
January 1997. They document that men transact 45% more than women. They also find that 
this excessive trading reduces men’s net returns by 2.65 percentage points a year as opposed to 
1.72 percentage points for women.  
 
An important caveat to these risk-aversion and trading studies is that they are undertaken in 
relation to the general population and the results may not be directly applicable to our subset of 
the population who are company directors. Johnson and Powell (1994) compare the decision 
making characteristics of males and females in “non managerial” positions with those in 
“managerial” positions and find that for those in managerial positions both genders display 
similar risk attitudes and make decisions of comparable quality. Atkinson et al. (2003) compare 
the performance and investment behavior of male and female fixed-income mutual fund 
managers. They find that male and female managed funds do not differ significantly in terms of 
performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Niessen and Ruenzi (2006) arrive at similar 
conclusions about influence of gender on mutual fund performance. 
 
One further aspect of gender differences, especially relevant in the context of insider trading 
are attitudes to ethical decision making. Betz et al. (1989) use data from a sample of 213 
business school students and finds that men are more than twice as likely as women to engage 
in actions regarded as unethical. They find that fifty percent of the males were willing to buy 
stock with insider information. Beams et al. (2003) uses student subjects to test the relationship 
between the likelihood of trading based on insider information and subjective probabilities of 
 15 
deterrents and motivations for insider trading. Expected gain, guilt, cynicism, and fairness of 
laws were the determinants that had a significant relationship with the intent to transaction 
based on insider information. Additional findings of the study were that subjects did not view 
the determinants for themselves in a manner consistent with how they viewed those same 
deterrents and motivations for other people. With respect to gender differences, the study finds 
that certainty and social stigma were significantly higher for female respondents than for male 
respondents. Though student subjects are only a crude proxy for the managerial population, 
nevertheless, their paper seems to suggest that even if male and female directors may not differ 
in the information they possess, when and how they trade on this information may differ. 
 
Combining these different aspects of gender differences in relation to directors trading, we 
formulate our second hypothesis. We would expect female directors to be less likely to exploit 
market timing opportunities due to lower degrees of risk aversion, lower levels of 
overconfidence, more ethical behaviour, and exclusion from information in the first place. All 
of these factors work in the same direction, and consequently we would not expect there to be 
any pre-trade abnormal returns for female directors’ trades. How the market responds to the 
trade of a female director depends on whether the market believes that the trade is informative 
or not.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Abnormal returns associated with corporate insider trades depend on the 
gender of director making the trade: negative (positive) abnormal returns preceding directors’ 
purchases (sales) are smaller in absolute value for females than for males; post-trade  positive 
(negative) abnormal returns following directors’ purchases (sales) are smaller in absolute 
value for female  directors than for male directors. 
 
 
IV Data and Methodology 
The data on director’s dealings for the period 1st January 1994 to 30th September 2006 for UK 
companies is sourced from the Hemscott directors trading database. This dataset contains 
information on the trades undertaken by directors (both executive and non-executive), the 
director’s holdings and positions, for all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. The 
source dataset contains 374,145 entries pertaining to corporate insider trades (including large 
shareholders) in 4,412 different firms, and covers all companies that have entered or exited 
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since January 1994, and consequently avoids any survivorship biases. We decided to focus on 
the constituents of the FTSE All Share Index and the companies listed on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM), and so removed trades relating to other companies. To identify the 
director’s gender we use the Price Waterhouse Coopers CD register and the Corporate Register 
(various issues). We also cross checked our data for FTSE 350 companies with the female 
FTSE index reports published by the Centre for Women Business Leaders, Cranfield 
University. Daily returns and daily market capitalizations for the event firms, and the 
benchmark FTSE All Share Index returns are sourced from Datastream.6 The original Hemscott 
dataset provides information on various transaction types and security types, but we remove 
trades (option exercise, transfers, take-up of rights) other than open market purchases and sales 
of ordinary shares by directors. We also removed the transactions of large shareholders. 
 
 
After cleaning the dataset for duplicate and inaccurate or incomplete transactions, missing 
announcement dates and transactions dates, summary statistics on the raw data used in this 
study is presented in Table 1.  In this raw dataset there are a total of 80,930 trades by directors 
over the sample period, divided into 62,106 purchases of company stock and 18,824 sales: so 
there are three times as many purchases than sales. Trades by male executives constitute the 
largest group of trades (40.3% of the total number of director trades), with trades by female 
executives and non-executives being only a small percentage of the total. The average number 
of times that a director purchases shares is 4.04 over the twelve year sample period, and on 
average each director sells shares on 2.81 occasions. There is some evidence that male directors 
trade more than females, but the differences in the average number of trades between 
executives and non-executives is mixed. The total value of directors’ purchases between 1994 
and 2006 has been over £3 billion, but the cumulated total value of sell transactions was almost 
£11 billion, making directors net sellers of corporate equity over this period. The average value 
of a director’s purchase was almost £50,000 but the average value of a sale was over half-a-
million pounds: so that directors’ sales are fewer in number but much larger in value. 
 
                                                 
6 The FTSE All share index includes the FTSE100, FTSE250 and the smaller companies. It does not include the 
fledgling companies or the AIM companies. The directors trading dataset however includes AIM companies. 
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In order to undertake an event study based on daily data, we need to identify a daily signal for a 
directors’ trade taking into account multiple and possibly conflicting signals when more than 
one director trades on the same day in the same firm. The standard approach to identifying a 
daily trading signal is to aggregate the number of shares traded, and define either a buy or sell 
signal if the net number of trades is positive or negative. However this procedure is 
inappropriate when multiple directors with multiple characteristics (gender and type) are 
trading on the same day.  Our approach is therefore to construct sub-samples of the raw dataset, 
in which we then condition on either director category, director gender or both characteristics. 
 
In our analysis of the director’s transactions, we work with three subsets of the data. The first 
subset (Sub-sample 1) conditions on gender, and the second subset (Sub-sample 2) conditions 
on category. To obtain these first two sub-samples we partition the raw dataset based on the 
gender (or category) of the director who is trading after eliminating trades on the same day by 
directors of different genders (or categories) and we then aggregate multiple purchase and sale 
transactions for each company on the same day to get the sub-samples by gender and category 
The first subset (Sub-sample 1) is obtained by discarding those firm-days where more than one 
gender of director is trading. That is, if both a male and a female director are trading in the 
same stock on the same day, we exclude these observations for that day from Sub-sample 1.  Of 
the remaining firm-days we aggregate the purchases and sales by director gender (either male 
or female) and define the trading signal based on the net number of shares bought or sold: a buy 
signal results from positive net trades, and a sell signal from negative net trades. Summary 
statistics on this subset of the data are provided in Table 2, Panel A. There are a total of 36,129 
company-day buy signals, (split between 35,146 male and 983 females) and 10,975 company-
day sell signals (split 10,817 males and 158 females), meaning that these are the number of 
days across time and companies when at least one director traded. If more than one director 
traded, then to identify whether that company-day observation is a buy or sell signal the 
number of shares traded is aggregated: a positive net quantity of shares trades represents a buy 
signal, and a negative net number of shares a sell signal. 
 
Similarly, the second subset (Sub-sample 2) is sorted by the category of the director who is 
trading (without consideration of gender), and trades by executive and non-executive directors 
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on the same firm-days are discarded. The remaining trades are aggregated by category for each 
firm-day based on the net number of shares traded to obtain buy and sell signals. We use sub-
samples 1 and 2 to compare abnormal returns around the transactions of male and female 
directors and those of executive directors and non-executive directors. Summary statistics on 
Sub-sample 2 are presented in Table 2 Panel B. 
 
However, these two sub-samples are single sorts, that condition on either gender or category. 
Our third dataset (Sub-sample 3) is a double sort which first sorts by director category and sorts 
again by gender.  We again eliminate transactions where any two directors of the same category 
or the same gender have traded on the same day and then aggregate the remaining purchases 
and sales to obtain the daily buy and sell signals.  Summary statistics on Sub-sample 3 are 
presented in Table 2 Panel C. 
 
To investigate the patterns in daily stock prices around directors buys and sell signals, we apply 
the standard event study methodology based on the market model benchmark7.  The event day 
is designated by the announcement date of the director’s. There is some disagreement on 
whether the announcement date or the actual transaction date is should be used as the event 
date. Hillier and Marshall (2002) note that when a director buys or sell shares, some of the 
more sophisticated outsiders could be expected to have information on the details of the trade 
and they define the event date as the transaction date. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) after consultation 
with practitioners conclude that the use of the announcement date is more appropriate as this is 
the date when the news of a director’s transaction reaches the market.   
 
We consider an event period of -60 to 60 days around the announcement date. The estimation 
period for the parameters in the market model starts on day -61 and is 250 days in length.  We 
use a standardized cross-sectional t-test and the Corrado rank sum test to test for the 
significance of the average abnormal returns (AARs) and the cumulative average abnormal 
                                                 
7 We also run the event study using a market adjusted returns model and also using Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) as a robustness check and the results are presented in the section: Robustness Checks. The market 
adjusted returns model calculates the abnormal returns as mtRitRitAR −= . So the Abnormal return for a security 
for time t is simple the observed return for the security (Rit) at time t minus the observed return on the market 
index (Rmt) at time t.  
 
 19 
returns (CAARs). The generalized sign test is used to test the fraction of firms with 
significantly positive abnormal returns for both single event days and event windows. We also 
calculate the CAARs for various windows. Boehmer et al.  (1991)  developed  the   
Standardised cross sectional t-test to  address  the  problem  of  misspecification  due  to  event-
induced  variance  changes. With  this  procedure,  the  event  period  residuals  are  
standardized  by  the  estimation  period  standard  deviation  and  then  the  average  event  
period  standardized  residual  is  divided by  its contemporaneous  cross-sectional  standard  
error. To tackle the issue of non-normality of abnormal returns, which can cause 
misspecification in parametric t-tests in event studies (Brown and Warner 1985 and Campbell 
and Wesley 1993), event clustering, thin trading, increase in the variance of event date 
abnormal returns (Corrado 1989 and Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen 1991), we employ the 
corrado rank sum test which is robust to non normal distribution, cross sectional dependence, 
overlapping sample periods, thin trading and serial dependence in abnormal returns as 
demostrated by Campbell and Wesley 1993. 
 
V. Results 
The summary statistics in Tables 1 and 2 provides evidence on the patterns in directors’ buy 
and sell trades by category and gender of directors. Table 1 reports summary numbers on the 
raw data of directors trades, whereas Table 2 presents summary statistics on the directors’ 
trades aggregated on a daily basis. All of the panels in both tables show that for the raw data 
and the aggregated data that the number of buy trades is greater than the number of sell trades. 
However, the mean and the median number of shares, and value of shares traded is larger for 
sell transactions. On average male directors trade more than female directors, and in slightly 
larger quantities. Executives and non-executives purchase similar sized amounts, but non-
executives appear to sell shares in larger quantities. Directors appear to be buying more shares 
in firms smaller than they sell in. The median firm value for buy trades based on both one-way 
and two-way classification is smaller for executive directors, non executive directors and male 
directors. Only the female directors seem to be buying more in larger firms: the mean market 
value for buy trades are larger for buys than for sells. 
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Both the number of shares traded as a percentage of market capitalization and number of shares 
transacted as a percentage of the directors holding are bigger for director’s sells than directors’ 
buys. This is observed for both executives and non-executives and both male and female 
directors. However, on making the separation by category and gender we find that non-
executives have higher values of shares traded as a percentage of market capitalization and the 
number of shares transacted as a percentage of their holding.  
 
The subsequent tables report the stock market abnormal returns for various time-period 
windows. We first report pre-trade and then in the subsequent tables we report the  market 
reaction post-trade announcement, and also the daily running average daily abnormal (AARS) 
and average cumulative abnormal returns (AARS and CAARS) for event days from -20 to +20 
days around the event. The results in Table 3, are illustrated in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 which in 
summary show that in general, directors tend to buy after a run down in prices and sell after a 
run up in prices.  This is observed both for the one-way (sub-sample 1 and 2) and two-way 
(sub-sample 3) classifications.  
 
Va Pre-event Market Timing of Directors Trades 
Table 3 Panel A reports that the 20 day cumulative abnormal return prior to the event of the 
directors’ purchase is -2.48%, meaning that the idiosyncratic fall in a company’s stock price 
averages 2.48% in the 20 days prior to the announcement of the directors’ purchase: directors 
buy after a significant run down in prices. Restricting the sample to Sub-sample 2, this pattern 
applies to both executives and non-executives: for executives, the CAAR for all event windows 
up to the event dates are significantly negative. For (-20,-1) we find that the CAAR are a 
significant -2.64% and for (-10,-1) window a significant -1.64%.  For non-executive directors 
also, we find significant negative abnormal returns for all the windows.  We find that the 
magnitude of these returns are less than those for executive directors. For (-20,-1) we find that 
the CAAR are a significant -1.83% and for (-10,-1) window a significant -1.05%. A t-test for 
the difference of means show that these differences are significant. If we consider the event day 
returns, for executive and non executive buy transactions, we find that for executives there is 
consistently significant proportion of transactions with negative returns from around day -12 to 
-1. For non executive directors this starts from day -10 and continues until day -1. The evidence 
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suggests that for buy transactions, both categories of director (executive and non-executive) 
seem to be able to time the market, though the executive directors are better able to time the 
market than their non-executive counterparts. 
 
Turning to directors’ sell trades, there is a symmetric pattern in stock prices movements. In the 
20 days prior to the announcement of the sell trade, stock prices rise by 2.17%. For executive 
directors’ sell transactions we find evidence that they sell after a significant run up in prices. 
We find significant positive returns for all windows. The CAARSs for the (-20,-1) window is 
2.01%; and for the (-10,-1) window is 1.20%. For non executive director sell trades we find 
significant positive returns for all windows. The CAARs for the (-20,-1) window is 2.31%; and 
for the (-10,-1) window is 1.30%. This is slightly higher than that for executive sells, but both a 
t-test for difference in means and a rank test show that these are not significantly different. The 
evidence for sell transactions based on category alone the results seem to suggest that while 
both categories are able to time the market and that there is no significant differences between 
the two categories. 
 
Next, we consider classification based on gender of the director, using sub-sample 1 of the 
dataset. For the male director buy transactions, we find significant CAARs for all event 
windows. The CAARs for the (-20,-1) period is a significant -2.50% and that for the (-10,-1) 
period is a significant -1.10%.  For female buys, again we find significant negative CAARs for 
all the event windows. The CAARs for the (-20,-1) period is a significant -1.74% and that for 
the (-10,-1) period is a significant -1.54%.  Both a t-test for a significant difference in means 
and rank test fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is a significant difference in the mean 
returns of male and female buy transactions for any of the windows. The event day returns 
show that for male buys the proportion of transactions earning significant negative abnormal 
returns start on day -20 and this trend continues consistently until day -3. However, for female 
buys we find that the proportion of transactions earning negative abnormal returns is not 
negative at any time prior to the event date. 
  
For the male sell transactions, the CAARS for the event window (-20,-1) is a significant 2.19% 
and that for the window (-10,-1) is significant 1.29%. For female sells, the CAARs for the 
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period (-20,-1) is an insignificant 1.14% and that for   (-10,-1) is again an insignificant 0.61%. 
While the abnormal returns for female sells seem to be smaller than for male sells, a t-test for 
the difference in means and a rank test show that these differences are not statistically 
significant. Examining the event day returns we find that for male sells, the proportion of 
transactions with positive abnormal returns start from day -30 and the trend continues until day 
-1. While for female sells, we find that there is no significant proportion of positive abnormal 
return transactions any time prior to the event date.  
 
In summary the event study results based on a one way classification of directors: either by 
gender (sub-sample 1) or category (sub-sample 2), shows significant differences only in the 
case of executive and non executive buy trades. There seems to be no difference between 
genders for buy or sell trades.   
 
However must bear in mind that executive transactions includes both male executive 
transactions and female executive transactions and transactions by gender included transactions 
by both categories of directors, executive and non-executive. In order to separate out the 
separate effects of category and gender, we carry out a further analysis after a two-way 
partitioning of the dataset based on category and gender of the director who is trading (sub-
sample 3). These results are presented in Panel B of Table 3. 
 
For the male executive directors buy transactions we find that the CAARs for the (-20,-1) 
window is a significant -2.72% and for (-10,-1) is a significant -1.69%.  Also looking at event 
day returns the CAARS are significantly negative from about day -44 to day -4. In addition, the 
proportions of transactions with significantly negative abnormal returns starts from about day     
-13 and continue consistently up to day -1. Therefore, male executive directors display 
evidence of market timing in their buy transactions.  For the male non-executive directors’ buy 
transactions we find there are no significant proportions of negative abnormal return 
transactions prior to the event date. However, the CAARs are significantly negative from 
around day -25 relative to the event date right up to day -2. The CAARs for the window (-20,-
1) is a significant -1.84% and that for the (-10,-1) window is a significant -1.04 %. 
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For female executive directors buy transactions do not find any significant proportion of 
negative abnormal return transactions in the period prior to the event date. The CAARs for the 
(-20,-1) window is a significant -1.36% and that for (-10,-1) window is a significant - 0.88%. 
For the female non-executive buy transactions, we find there is no significant proportion of 
negative abnormal return transactions any time prior to the event window. The CAARs for the 
(-20,-1) window is a significant -1.96% and that for the (-10,-1) window is a significant             
-1.23%. Table 3 panel B shows the results of the t-test for difference in means and rank test for 
the various category and gender buy transactions. We find that for buy transactions the only 
consistent statistically significant difference is between male executive buys and male non- 
executive buys.   
 
Turning to the directors’ sell transactions, for the male executive directors sell transactions we 
find the proportion of transactions with significant positive abnormal returns start from day -16 
and go right up to day -1. The CAARs for the (-20,-1) window is significant 2.03% and that for 
the (-10,-1) window is significant 1.22%. For the male non-executive directors sell transactions 
we find a significant proportion of transactions having positive abnormal returns starting from 
around day -21 and going all the way up to day -2. The CAARs for the window (-20,-1) is a 
slightly significant 2.29% and that for the (-10,-1) window is a significant 1.32%.  
 
For the female executive sell transactions, we find that there is no significant proportion of 
positive abnormal return transactions in the period prior to the event date. The CAARs for the 
(-20,-1) window is an insignificant 0.54% and that for the (-10,-1) window is a insignificant 
0.10%. For the female non-executive sell transactions, we find no significant proportion of 
positive abnormal return transactions prior to the event date except on day -2. The CAARs for 
the period (-20,-1) is a slightly significant -2.48% and the CAARs for the (-10,-1) window is 
again a slightly significant 1.73%. Table 3 panel B shows the results of the t-test for difference 
in means and rank test for the various category*gender sell transactions for the various 
windows. We find that for sell transactions there is no significant difference between any of the 
various category*gender subgroups for any of the windows. 
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Vb Post-event Market Reaction to Directors Trades 
Table 4 Panel A reports that the 20 day cumulative abnormal return after a directors’ purchase 
is on average 1.55%, meaning that in the 20 days after a directors’ purchase of shares a 
company’s stock price typically rises on average by 1.55%. Restricting the sample to Sub-
sample 2, this pattern applies to both executives and non-executives: for executive buy 
transactions we find that the CAARs are a significant +1.70% for the (1, 20) and +1.30% for 
the (1, 10) window. There is an abnormal return of 0.49% on the announcement day, which 
cumulates to a +1.41% by the 5th day and to +1.79% by the 10th day.  For non-executive buys 
we find that the CAARs are significant and positive for all windows, but the magnitudes are 
much smaller than for executive buy trades. The CAARs for the (1, 20) window and (1, 10) 
window are +1.18% and +0.91% respectively. The return is a +0.37% on the announcement 
day, which cumulates to a +1.02% by the 5th day and to +1.27% by the 10th day.  Both t-test 
and the rank test show that the returns for buy trades are significantly different for all event 
windows. This seems to suggest that the markets consider the buy trades of executive directors 
to be more information revealing than that of non-executive directors. We observe that the 
returns are significantly greater in magnitude but also the speed of the market reaction is faster 
in the case of executive buys. 
 
For executive sell transactions, the CAARs are significantly negative for all the event windows. 
CAARs for the (1, 20) window and (1, 10) window are -1.22% and -0.72% respectively. The 
announcement period returns is a -0.12% which cumulates to a -0.53% by the 5th day and -0.84 
by the 10th day.  For non-executive sell tranasctions the CAARs are significantly negative for 
all the event windows. CAARs for the (1, 20) window and (1, 10) window are -1.07% and -
0.66% respectively. The announcement period returns is a -0.11% which cumulates to a -0.38% 
by the 5th day and -0.63 by the 10th day.  The price reaction seems to be faster for executive 
sales than for non-executive sales but in terms of magnitude of the reaction there seems to be 
no statistically significant difference based on the t-test and the rank test. 
 
Based on the gender of the director, we find that for male director buy trades the CAARs are 
significantly positive for all windows.  The CAARs are a significant +1.57% for the (1, 20) and 
+1.22% for the (1,10) window. There is an abnormal return of +0.47% on the announcement 
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day, which cumulates to a +1.34% by the 5th day and to +1.68% by the 10th day. For female 
director buy trades the CAARs are +0.88% for the (1, 20) window and +0.39% for the (1, 10) 
window. There is an abnormal return of +0.42% on the announcement day, which cumulates to 
a +0.82% by the 5th day and to +0.95% by the 10th day. The result seems to suggest that the 
price reaction to male directors buy trades seem to be faster and larger than that for female 
directors. The t-test and rank test confirms that there is a significant difference in the returns of 
buy trades of the two genders of directors for all the event windows. 
 
For male director sell trades the CAARs are significantly positive for all windows.  The 
CAARs are a significant -1.20% for the (1, 20) and -0.73% for the (1,10) window. There is an 
abnormal return of -0.14% on the announcement day, which cumulates to a -0.53% by the 5th 
day and to -0.87% by the 10th day. For female director sell trades the CAARs are -0.89% for 
the (1, 20) window and -0.60% for the (1, 10) window. There is an insignificant abnormal 
return of +0.10% on the announcement day, which cumulates to a -0.30% by the 5th day and to 
-0.50% by the 10th day. The markets seem to react faster to male director sell signals than 
female director sell signals, however, the t-test and rank test show that there is no significant 
difference in the returns of buy trades of the two genders of directors for any of the event 
windows. Thus in terms of gender, the markets do not seem to value more the sell signals of 
any one gender of director. 
 
In order to separate out the separate effects of category and gender in the post-trade event study, 
we now report the results after a two-way partitioning of the dataset based on category and 
gender of the director who is trading (sub-sample 3). These results are presented in Panel B of 
Table 4. 
 
Looking first at buy trades, the male executive director’s transactions show significant positive 
abnormal returns for all windows. The CAARs for the (1, 20) and (1, 10) window are a highly 
significant +1.72% and 1.32% respectively. The announcement period abnormal return is a 
0.49% which cumulates to 1.42% by the 5th day and +1.81% by the 10th day. For the male non-
executives again we find significant positive abnormal returns for all windows but the 
magnitudes are smaller. The CAARs for the (1, 20) and (1, 10) window are a highly significant 
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+1.22% and +0.94% respectively.  The differences are significant for all the event windows. 
The speed of reaction also is faster for male executive trades than for male non-executive trades.  
 
The female executive director’s transactions show significant abnormal returns only for the (1, 
10). The CAARs for the (1, 20) and (1, 10) window are an insignificant +1.54% and significant 
+1.26% respectively. The announcement period abnormal return is a +0.58% which cumulates 
to a 1.23% by the 5th day and +1.83% by the 10th day. These are not statistically significantly 
different from either the male executive abnormal returns or the male non-executive abnormal 
returns, but they are greater than that for the male non-executive directors. The markets do not 
seem to react less in the case of female director buy transactions when compared to their male 
counterparts, but the speed of the reaction is slower. For the female non-executives again we 
find significant positive abnormal returns for all windows but the magnitudes are smaller. The 
CAARs for the (1, 20) and (1, 10) window are an insignificant +0.52% and +0.11% 
respectively.  The announcement period returns are a insignificant +0.33% cumulating to 
0.58% and 0.45% by the 5th and 10th day. 
 
There is a consistent significant difference is between the executive male buys and                     
non-executive male and non-executive female buys. In addition, we find significant differences 
in the returns of non-executive male directors and non-executive female directors. Thus taken 
in total the evidence seems to suggest that market considers the buy trades of executive as a 
much stronger signal than non-executives and for the non-executive category the signals of 
male directors are considered much stronger than that of their female counterparts. 
 
Turning to directors’ sell trades, the male executive director’s transactions show significant 
negative abnormal returns for all windows. The CAARs for the (1, 20) and (1, 10) window are 
a highly significant -1.24% and -0.75% respectively. The announcement period abnormal 
return is -0.13% which cumulates to a -0.54% by the 5th day and -0.87% by the 10th day. For 
the male non-executives again we find significant negative abnormal returns for all windows 
but the magnitudes are smaller. The CAARs for the (1, 20) and (1, 10) window are a significant 
-1.06% and -0.64% respectively. The announcement period abnormal return is a -0.17% which 
cumulates to a -0.47% by the 5th day and -0.81% by the 10th day. The differences between male 
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executive and male non-executives are not significant for any of the event windows. But the 
speed of reaction seems to be faster for male executive trades than for male non-executive 
trades.  
 
The female executive director’s transactions do not show significant abnormal returns for any 
of the event windows. The CAARs for the (1, 20) and (1, 10) window are an insignificant         
-0.31% and insignificant +0.16% respectively. The announcement period abnormal return is a 
insignificant +0.04% which cummulates to a insignificant +0.25% by the 5th day and +0.20% 
by the 10th day. For the female non-executives again we find significant negative abnormal 
returns for all windows. The CAARs for the (1, 20) and (1, 10) window are a significant -
2.18% and -2.30% respectively.  The announcement period returns are a insignificant +0.22% 
cumulating to -1.51% and -2.08% by the 5th and 10th day. However, owing to the small number 
of  transactions for this group, the results may be idiosyncratic. 
There is no significant difference between any of the category genders. Therefore taken in total 
we find that for sale transaction on a finer partitioning of the dataset, the signals do not provide 
any information to the market. 
 
Vc Multivariate Analysis of CAAR: 
In this section, we conduct a multivariate analysis of the CAAR through the following 
regression models. We use logarithmic transformations due to the nonlinear relationship 
between the variables and also because some variables such as market capitalizations exhibit 
very high values. The two regression models are 
 
iTRADEi GDumCdumMTDumHoldValMcapCAAR µγγγγγγα +++++++= 654321. %    (1) 
and  
iTRADEi VVVMTDumHoldValMcapCAAR µγγγγγγγα ++++++++= 3726154321, %    (2) 
 
Where the dependent variable is the CAARi,TRADE for the “i”th event, and the TRADE could be 
either a buy or a sell trade, for the windows (0, +5) (0, +10) and (0, +20). The independent 
variables are as follows: Mcap  is the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm on the 
event date; Val  is natural log of the value of shares traded; % Hold is natural log of the 
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number of shares transacted as a percentage of total holding before the transaction;  MTDum is 
a dummy variable which captures multiple trading on the event date. This represents multiple 
buys in case of buy transactions and multiple sales in the case of sales transactions; Cdum is a 
dummy variable which captures the category of the director who trades (i.e. executive or non 
executive). The category dummy takes a value of 1 if the director is a non-executive director or 
0 otherwise; GDum is a dummy variable which captures the gender of the director who trades 
(i.e. male or female). The gender dummy takes on a value of 1 if the director is a female or 0 
otherwise. The second regression equation (2) includes an alternative specification of the 
gender and category dummy variables: V1, V2 and V3 are dummies to capture the category 
and gender of the director who trades. V1 is equal to 1 if director is a male non-executive or 0 
otherwise. V2 is equal to 1 if the director is a female executive director or 0 otherwise and 
V3=1 if the director is a female non-executive or 0 otherwise. The director is an executive male 
director if V1=V2=V3=0. 
We check for the correlations between the independent variables and the results are shown in 
Table 5 Panel A1 and A2. Though we do not find any significant correlations between the 
variables we also compute the variance inflation factors after the regression. This is shown in 
Table 6.  The estimated parameter coefficients from the regression are reported in Panels B1 
and B2 of Table 5. For both the models, for buy transactions the results are very clear. The 
coefficients for Mcap, Val, %hold and MTdum all show the expected signs and are significant. 
The results show that the when directors buy, the trades provide a stronger and more effective 
signal to the market, the smaller the size of the firm. For small firms in the absence of extensive 
analyst coverage and a general lack of information regarding these firms, the information that 
directors trades convey is important. The sign and the significance of the coefficient of Val 
suggests that the greater the value of shares bought, the stronger the signal is. Similarly we find 
that the buy signals are stronger when directors are buying more shares as a percentage of their 
holdings. MTdum is also significant implying that multiple trades convey a stronger signal to 
the market. The directors’ category dummy CDUM is significant while the gender dummy 
GDUM is not. Thus market reaction does not depend on the gender of the director but rather 
the category of the director who is trading. 
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 This becomes clearer still when we look at the results in panel B2 of Table 5, which reports the 
results of specification (2). Mcap, Val, %Hold, MTdum are all significant as in Panel B1. Out 
of V1, V2 and V3 only V1 is significant and the negative sign shows that after controlling for 
other variables, the only significant difference is between CAARs generated by the trades of 
Male executive and Male non-executive directors. Thus, the evidence seems to suggest that in 
terms of market reaction to buy trades, only the category of the director matters and that too 
only for male directors.   
 
We further test for the linear combinations of the coefficients which represent the returns made 
by the different category and gender groups after controlling for other factors. The results are 
show in Table 7 and Table 8. The results show that all buys have positive abnormal returns 
while for sells most are not significant. We test whether these are significantly different from 
each other and we find the significant difference exists only for category not for gender and 
with in the category executive males seem to elicit better market reaction than non executives 
 
VI Robustness Checks 
In order to confirm that our results are robust to alternative specifications of the models, we 
consider two robustness checks 
a) Market Adjusted Returns: The choice of the benchmark model is an important 
determinant of the abnormal returns around the event. We re-run the analysis using market 
adjusted returns model. The results are presented in table 10. A comparison with Table 4 and 
Table 5 shows that there is only small quantitative differences between the two methods.   
b) Buy-and-Hold Returns: We re-run the analysis computing performance using the buy 
and hold abnormal returns instead of the cumulative abnormal returns. The results are shown in 
Table 9. A comparison with Table 4 and Table 5 shows that there is little quantitative 
difference between the two methods.   
 
VII Conclusions 
This paper has examined abnormal returns to directors’ trades before and after the 
announcement day using the event study methodology  to test whether there is any significant 
difference in the abilities of a particular category ( i.e. executive or non executive) or gender of 
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director (as proxied by gender) to time the market. We also examined whether the market 
viewed the trades of any particular category or gender of director differently. The event study 
results seems to suggest, consistent with previous studies that in general directors possess 
market timing ability in that buy after a run down in prices and sell  after a run up in prices with 
reversals immediately following the trades. The market also seems to view purchase signals as 
a more credible signals about firms future prospects than sell signals, this is because of the 
market’s inability to distinguish between information driven sales and sales for other reasons. 
To get a clearer picture, we analysed the post event CAARs after controlling for the size, value 
of shares traded, the number of shares traded as a percentage of holdings, multiple trade 
dummies and find that the market reaction to a directors trade is not influenced by the gender of 
the director but is affected by the category of the director.  
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Figure 1: Average Size and Composition of UK Boards of Directors in 2006 by Category and Gender 
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Source: Female FTSE Index and Report 2006, Published by the Cranfield International Centre for Women Business Leaders, Cranfield University. 
 
  FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 350 
  E Non-E Total E Non-E Total E Non-E Total  
Male 376 641 1,017 696 1,265 1,961 1,072 1,906 2,978 
Female 15 102 117 29 110 139 44 212 256 
 Total 391 743 1,134 725 1,375 2,100 1,116 2,118 3,234 
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              Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Raw Data 
Table 1 reports the transaction type, number of trades over the sample, number of directors trading, average number of trades per director, 
the total value of all trades and the average value of a single trade of all directors and broken down by category and gender. This table is 
based on the raw dataset, before aggregating the daily buy and sell signals. F = female, M = Male; P = Purchases and S=sales. 
Trade Type Director 
Category 
Director 
Gender 
No of 
Trades 
Percent 
of Total 
trades 
No of 
Directors 
Average 
Number  
of trades 
per 
director 
Total 
Value of 
all trades 
(£ 
million) 
Average 
value of a 
trade (£) 
Purchases     62,106 76.74 15,357 4.04 3,094 49,821 
P Exec M 32,613 40.30 8,276 3.94 1,460 44,767 
P Exec F 1,038 1.28 274 3.79 21 20,091 
P Non-exec M 27,324 33.76 6,471 4.22 1,570 57,459 
P Non-exec F 1,131 1.40 336 3.37 43 38,285 
Sales     18,824 23.26 6,689 2.81 10,913 579,717 
S Exec M 12,421 15.35 4,344 2.86 6,320 508,816 
S Exec F 260 0.32 119 2.18 127 488,462 
S Non-exec M 6,038 7.46 2,173 2.78 4,320 715,469 
S Non-exec F 105 0.13 53 1.98 146 1,386,667 
Total Trades     80,930 100.00     14,007 173,072 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Sub-samples of Daily Trading Signals 
This table reports the descriptive statistics on the four sub-samples of data constructed from the raw data after aggregating over daily trades 
to obtain daily trading signals. 
 Panel A: Sub-sample 1   Buy Sample Sell Sample 
  
All 
Directors Male Female 
All 
directors  Male Female 
Number of Daily Signals   36,129 35,146 983 10,975 10,817 158 
Market Value  of firms (£ million): Mean 1,918 1,872 3,580 1,746 1,754 1,189 
 Median 108 104 278 158 158 140 
Value of Shares Traded (£): Mean 49,425 77,209 27,538 566,472 909,560 303,730 
 Median 8,505 10,530 6,650 42,165 63,000 28,882 
% of Holdings Traded: Mean 31.15 67.26 53.97 0.20 20.00 27.00 
 Median 13.12 16.86 44.83 0.09 9.00 13.00 
Trade value as % of market cap: Mean 1.94 0.20 0.06 7.57 0.76 0.39 
 Median 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.46 0.05 0.03 
 
Panel B: Sub-sample 2  Buy Sample Sell Sample 
  Exec Non-Exec Exec 
Non-
Exec 
Number of Signals   16,275 17,386 6,761 3,417 
Market Value  of firms (£ million): Mean 2,458 1,588 2,139 1,182 
 Median 111 116 178 131 
Value of Shares Traded (£): Mean 60,963 73,340 603,568 824,869 
 Median 9,600 10,002 55,700 58,028 
% of Holdings Traded: Mean 46.87 53.24 19.00 24.00 
 Median 8.72 26.86 9.00 11.00 
Trade value as % of market cap: Mean 0.15 0.16 0.49 0.53 
  Median 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 
 
Panel C: Sub-sample 3  Buy Sample 
  
 Sell Sample 
  
    ME MNE FE FNE   ME MNE FE FNE 
Number of Signals  15,565 16,579 359 622  6,578 3,375 110 48 
Market Value  of firms (£ million): Mean 2,478 1,402 2,047 4,442  2,171 1,166 740 2,219 
 Median 111 108 207 388  179 130 121 214 
Value of Shares Traded (£): Mean 61,423 73,863 15,542 34,542  600,820 834,820 334,430 233,360 
 Median 9,750 10,046 3,000 7,925  55,426 58,500 39,150 19,805 
% of Holdings Traded: Mean 45.10 50.40 37.55 63.57  19.00 24.00 25.00 30.37 
 Median 8.81 25.00 5.80 73.94  9.00 11.00 11.00 19.80 
Trade value as % of market cap: Mean 0.15 0.16 0.04 0.07  0.48 0.54 0.51 0.12 
  Median 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00   0.03 0.06 0.04 0.01 
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Table 3. Reports the results of the event studies for the various  pre-event windows . Panel A reports the results for the results based on the 
category of the director. Panel B reports the results of the event study on subsamples formed on the basis of category and gender of the 
director. Panel B1 reports the results of the pairwise test for difference in CAARS between the various subgroups. The t and z are the 
statistics from a t-test and a wilcoxon rank sum test respecively. In Panel B1, EM=Male Executive, NM=Male Non-Executive, EF=Female 
Executive, NF=Female Non executive. The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10,  0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a 2-tailed standardised cross sectional test. 
 
Panel A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B 
Marktet Model Buy Sell 
 Director  (-20,-1)   (-10,-1)   (-5,-1) (-1,0) (-20,-1) (-10,-1)  (-5,-1) (-1,0) 
Male Executive -2.72%*** -1.69%*** -0.93%*** 0.40%*** 2.03%*** 1.22%*** 0.64%*** -0.02% 
Male Non-executive -1.84%*** -1.04%*** -0.39%*** 0.41%*** 2.29%* 1.32%*** 0.72%*** -0.08%*** 
Female Executive -1.36%** -0.88%* -0.49%$ 0.64%* 0.54% 0.10% 0.08% 0.21% 
Female Non-executive -1.96%*** -1.23%** -0.65%** 0.25% 2.48%* 1.73%* 0.65% 0.30% 
 
Panel B1 
Market Model Buy Sell 
 Director (-20,-1) (-20,-1) 
  t z t z 
EM-NM -5.63 -6.11 -1.17 -1.06 
EM - EF -2.15 -2.05 -1.20 1.13 
EM- NF -1.50 -1.14 -0.38 0.17 
NM - EF -0.76 -0.79 1.41 1.35 
NM - NF -0.22 0.60 -0.15 0.39 
EFB- NF 0.75 1.05 -1.14 -0.69 
 
Market Model Buy Sell 
 Director (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (-1,0) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (-1,0) 
  t z t z t z t z t z t z 
EM - NM -5.56 -6.00 -6.20 -6.31 6.28 5.77 -0.62 -0.24 -0.72 -1.00 0.32 -0.09 
EM - EF -1.63 -2.02 -1.20 -1.08 0.32 0.32 1.25 0.85 -1.39 -1.77 -0.98 -0.60 
EM - NF -1.21 -1.54 -1.17 -0.16 3.60 3.34 -0.68 -0.40 1.51 0.91 -0.03 -0.45 
NM - EF -0.33 -0.83 0.27 0.35 -1.24 -0.96 1.35 0.90 -1.21 -1.51 -1.05 -0.57 
NM - NF 0.49 0.10 0.01 1.72 1.55 1.81 -0.54 -0.36 1.61 1.04 -0.08 -0.41 
EF - NF 0.57 0.76 0.37 0.82 1.96 1.89 -1.40 -0.89 2.02 1.75 0.46 0.01 
Marktet Model Buy Sell 
 Director (-20,-1) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (-1,0) (-20,-1) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (-1,0) 
All Directors -2.48%*** -1.52%*** -0.78%*** 0.42%*** 2.17%*** 1.28%*** 0.69%*** -0.02%*** 
Executive -2.64%*** -1.64%*** -0.90%*** 0.41%*** 2.01%*** 1.20%*** 0.63%*** -0.02% 
Non Executive -1.83%*** -1.05%*** -0.40%*** 0.41%*** 2.31%*** 1.33%*** 0.72%*** -0.07% 
t- test for diff  -5.33 -5.26 -5.98 0.003 -1.32 -0.82 -0.79 0.77 
Rank test  for diff  -5.69 -5.65 -5.94 1.45 -1.20 -0.42 -0.41 0.71 
         
Male -2.50%*** -1.10%*** -0.59%*** 0.42%*** 2.19%*** 1.29%*** 0.69%*** -0.02% 
Female -1.74%*** -1.54%*** -0.79%*** 0.39%** 1.14% 0.61% 0.26% 0.24% 
t -test for diff  1.93 1.46 0.98 -0.28 -1.12 -1.03 -0.94 1.13 
Rank test  for diff  1.41 1.72 -0.132 -0.88 -1.18 -0.54 -0.811 0.54 
 41 
Table 4. Reports the results of the event studies for various post-event windows. Panel A reports the results for the results based on the 
category of the director. Panel B reports the results of the event study on subsamples formed on the basis of category and gender of the 
director. Panel B1 reports the results of the pairwise test for difference in CAARS between the various subgroups. The t and z are the 
statistics from a t-test and a wilcoxon rank sum test respecively. In Panel B1, EM=Male Executive, NM=Male Non-Executive, EF=Female 
Executive, NF=Female Non executive. EM=Male Executive, NM=Male Non-Executive, EF=Female Executive, NF=Female Non executive. 
The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed 
standardised cross sectional test. 
 
Panel A 
Marktet Model Buy Sell 
 Director  (1,20)   (1,10)   (1,5)  (0,1)  (1,20)   (1,10)   (1,5)  (0,1) 
All Directors 1.55%*** 1.20%*** 0.85%*** 0.85%*** -1.19%*** -0.73%*** -0.39%*** -0.28%*** 
Executive 1.70%*** 1.30%*** 0.91%*** 0.92%*** -1.22%*** -0.72%*** -0.41%*** -0.26%*** 
Non Executive 1.18%*** 0.91%*** 0.66%*** 0.63%*** -1.07%*** -0.66%*** -0.33%*** -0.29%*** 
t -test for diff  4.41 4.87 4.47 6.66 -0.68 -0.36 -0.78 0.40 
Rank test  for diff  4.60 4.79 4.37 6.24 -0.92 -0.67 -2.30 -0.11 
                
Male 1.57%*** 1.22%*** 0.87%*** 0.86%*** -1.20%*** -0.73%*** -0.39%*** -0.28%*** 
Female 0.88%** 0.53%* 0.39%* 0.59%*** -0.89% -0.60% -0.39% -0.07% 
t -test for diff  -2.28 -3.26 -3.13 -2.44 0.40 0.22 -0.01 0.87 
Rank test  for diff  -2.26 -2.96 -3.41 -2.37 0.92 0.87 0.72 0.72 
 
 
Panel B 
Marktet Model Buy Sell 
 Director  (1,20)   (1,10)   (1,5) (0,1)  (1,20)   (1,10)   (1,5) (0,1) 
Male Executive 1.72%*** 1.32%*** 0.93%*** 0.92%*** -1.24%*** -0.75%*** -0.42%*** -0.27%*** 
Male Nonexecutive 1.22%*** 0.94%*** 0.67%*** 0.65%*** -1.06%*** -0.64%*** -0.31%*** -0.29%*** 
Female Executive 1.54%** 1.26%*** 0.65%** 0.87%*** -0.31% 0.16% 0.21% 0.01% 
Female Nonexecutive 0.52% 0.11% 0.24% 0.44%** -2.18% -2.30% -1.74% -0.25% 
 
Panel B1 
Market Model Buy Sell 
 Director (1,20) (1,20) 
  t z t z 
EM - NM 4.16 4.33 -0.84 -1.06 
EM - EF 0.35 0.50 -0.97 -1.31 
EM - NF 3.19 2.91 0.76 0.12 
NM - EF -0.65 -0.45 -0.77 -1.05 
NM - NF 1.86 1.83 0.90 0.28 
EF - NF 1.65 1.57 1.20 0.93 
 
Market Model Buy Sell 
 Director (1,10) (1,5) (0,1) (1,10) (1,5) (0,1) 
  t z t z t z t z t z t z 
EM - NM 4.48 4.39 4.36 4.27 -0.37 0.73 -0.72 -1.00 -1.06 -2.51 0.76 0.82 
EM - EF 0.17 0.26 1.21 1.14 -1.26 -0.73 -1.39 -1.77 -1.32 -1.61 -0.79 0.03 
EM - NF 4.67 4.01 3.45 3.87 1.08 1.45 1.51 0.91 1.71 0.74 -0.91 -1.02 
NM - EF -0.86 -0.70 0.12 0.19 -1.16 -0.96 -1.21 -1.51 -1.08 -1.01 -0.96 -0.15 
NM - NF 3.24 2.89 2.18 2.84 1.24 1.29 1.61 1.04 1.85 1.07 -1.06 -1.12 
EF - NF 2.60 2.41 1.34 1.74 1.71 1.66 2.02 1.75 2.16 1.30 -0.19 -0.86 
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Table 6. The table reports the variance inflation factors for the coefficient of each of the independent variable, to check for multicollinearity for the 
regression µγγγγγγγα ++++++++= 3626154321 % VVVMTDumHoldValMcapCAAR . The VIF is an index which measures how much the 
variance of a coefficient is increased because of collinearity. the magnitude of multicollinearity by considering the size of the . VIF >= 4 is an 
arbitrary but common cut-off criterion for deciding when a given independent variable displays "too much" multicollinearity. Values above 4 suggest a 
multicollinearity problem. 
 
Buy sample Sell Sample Variable 
1 day post 5 day post 20 day post 1 day post 5 day post 20 day post 
mcap 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.07 1.07 1.07 
val 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.41 1.41 1.41 
perofhold 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.39 1.39 1.39 
dmulpur 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.12 1.12 1.12 
v1 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.03 1.03 1.03 
v2 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 
v3 1.03 1.03 1.03 1 1 1 
Mean Vif 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.15 
 
 
 
Table 7. The Table reports the linear combinations of the coefficients and their significance for the different category and gender groups, after the  
following regression µγγγγγγγα ++++++++= 3626154321 % VVVMTDumHoldValMcapCAAR . The linear combinations represent the 
returns made by the different category gender groups. Where, M=Male, F=Female, E=Executive, N=Non executive. 
 
 
Buys Sells Buys Sells Buys Sells 
I day Post CAAR 5 Day post CAAR 20 day Post CAAR 
  E N E N E N E N E N E N 
0.0096 0.0069 -0.0051 -0.004 0.0201 0.0164 -0.0076 -0.0067 0.0555 0.0486 0.0004 0.00159 
-6.65 -5.04 (-2.38) (-2.20) -9.09 -7.7 (-2.19) (-1.92) -13.88 -12.64 -0.05 -0.24 
M (p<.0001) (p<.0001) (p=0.017) (p=0.028) (p<.0001) (p<.0001) (p=0.029) (p=0.055) (p<.0001) (p<.0001) (p=0.957) (p=0.812) 
0.112 0.0087 -0.0017 -0.0044 0.0208 0.014 0.0007 -0.0169 0.0614 0.046 0.011 -0.0063 
-4.24 -3.49 (-0.460) (-0.850) -5.12 -3.65 -0.011 (-2.10) -8.33 -6.6 -0.94 (-0.390) 
F (p<.0001) (p<.0001) (p=0.649) (p=0.394) (p<.0001) (p<.0001) (p=0.909) (p=0.055) (p<.0001) (p<.0001) (p=0.349) (p=0.694) 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. The table reports the results for the test for significant difference between the coefficients, after the following regression 
µγγγγγγγα ++++++++= 3626154321 % VVVMTDumHoldValMcapCAAR .Where, EM = Male executive, NM=Male Non executive, 
EF=Female Executive, NF=Female Non executive, M=Male, F=Female, E=Executive, N=Non executive. 
 
 
    Buy Sample Sell Sample 
    1 day post 5 day post 20  day post 1 day post 5 day post 20  day post 
EM - NM F 28.92 25.38 26.56 0.24 0.58 0.35 
  p val 0 0 0 0.6261 0.4464 0.5561 
EM - EF F 0.51 0.04 0.82 1.09 2.5 1.12 
  p val 0.4751 0.8348 0.3642 0.2958 0.1141 0.2907 
EM - NF F 0.14 3.24 2.48 0.02 1.4 0.2 
  p val 0.71 0.0718 0.1151 0.8856 0.2362 0.6548 
NM - EF F 3.34 1.57 3.9 0.88 1.99 0.86 
  p val 0.0675 0.2106 0.0482 0.3486 0.1582 0.3539 
NM-NF F 0.67 0.48 0.2 0.01 1.66 0.28 
  p val 0.4144 0.4876 0.6578 0.9404 0.1976 0.597 
EF-NF F 0.62 1.98 3.12 0.22 3.52 0.93 
  p val 0.4312 0.1597 0.0772 0.6407 0.0607 0.3339 
M - F F 1.16 0.1 0.13 0.41 0.04 0.02 
  p val 0.2821 0.7485 0.7195 0.5196 0.8494 0.8814 
E - N F 2.53 4.62 6.36 0.17 3.15 0.79 
  p val 0.112 0.0316 0.0116 0.6844 0.0762 0.3731 
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Table 9 . Reports the results of the event studies using the market model benchmark and the buy and hold abnormal returns for the various pre-event 
windows . Panel A reports the results for the results based on the category of the director. Panel B reports the results of the event study on subsamples 
formed on the basis of category and gender of the director. The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10,  0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed standardised cross sectional test. 
 
 
 
 Buy Sample Sell Sample 
Director (-20,-1) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (-1,0) (-20,-1) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (-1,0) 
Executive -2.34%*** -1.49%*** -0.84%*** 0.42%*** 2.12%*** 1.26%*** 0.66%*** -0.01% 
Non Executive -1.58%*** -0.92%*** -0.35%*** 0.41%*** 2.46%* 1.41%*** 0.76%*** -0.06% 
Male -2.19%*** -1.37%*** -0.72%*** 0.43%*** 2.31%*** 1.36%*** 0.73%*** -0.02% 
Female -1.53%*** -0.97%*** -0.55%*** 0.39%*** 1.37% 0.73% 0.31% 0.25% 
 
 Buy Sample Sell Sample 
Director (-20,-1) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (-1,0) (-20,-1) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (-1,0) 
Male Executive -2.42%*** -1.53%*** -0.86%*** 0.40%*** 2.13%*** 1.29%*** 0.67%*** -0.02% 
Male Nonexecutive -1.58%*** -0.91%*** -0.34%*** 0.42%*** 2.44%*** 1.41%*** 0.76%*** -0.07%$ 
Female Executive -1.23%*** -0.76%*** -0.44%*** 0.63%*** 0.81% 0.27% 0.16% 0.22% 
Female Nonexecutive -1.69%*** -1.09%*** -0.61%*** 0.26%* 2.61%** 1.75%* 0.65% 0.31% 
 
 Buy Sample Sell Sample 
Director (1,20) (1,10) (1,5) (0,1) (1,20) (1,10) (1,5) (0,1) 
Executive 1.73%*** 1.33%*** 0.93%*** 0.93%*** -1.17%*** -0.68%*** -0.39%*** -0.26%*** 
Non Executive 1.22%*** 0.94%*** 0.67%*** 0.64%*** -1.00%*** -0.64%*** -0.28%*** -0.28%*** 
Male 1.60%*** 1.24%*** 0.88%*** 0.87%*** -1.14%*** -0.70%*** -0.37%*** -0.28%*** 
Female 0.91%*** 0.56%*** 0.41%*** 0.60%*** -0.78% -0.53% -0.35% -0.06% 
 
 Buy Sample Sell Sample 
Director (1,20) (1,10) (1,5) (0,1) (1,20) (1,10) (1,5) (0,1) 
Male Executive 1.75%*** 1.34%*** 0.95%*** 0.93%*** -1.19%*** -0.71%*** -0.40%*** -0.26%*** 
Male Nonexecutive 1.26%*** 0.98%*** 0.69%*** 0.65%*** -0.99%*** -0.61%*** -0.30%*** -0.28%*** 
Female Executive 1.55%*** 1.31%*** 0.66%*** 0.87%*** -0.14% 0.23% 0.25% 0.02% 
Female Nonexecutive 0.55% 0.14% 0.27% 0.45%*** -2.21% -2.22%$ -1.67% -0.24% 
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Table 10. Reports the results of the event studies using the market adjusted returns benchmark returns for the various pre-event and post event windows. 
Panel A reports the results for the results based on the category of the director. Panel B reports the results of the event study on subsamples formed on the 
basis of category and gender of the director. The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a 2-tailed standardised cross sectional test. 
 
 
 
  Buy Sample Sell Sample 
 Director Buy (-20,-1)  Buy (-10,-1)  Buy (-5,-1) Buy(-1,0) Sell(-20,-1) Sell(-10,-1) Sell (-5,-1) Sell(-1,0) 
Executive -3.52%*** -2.06%*** -1.14%*** 0.28%*** 2.49%*** 1.46%*** 0.73%*** 0.02% 
Non Executive -2.37%*** -1.30%*** -0.55%*** 0.30%*** 2.50%*** 1.47%*** 0.78%*** -0.06% 
Male -3.31%*** -1.92%*** -1.00%*** 0.30%*** 2.57%*** 1.52%*** 0.77%*** 0.00% 
Female -1.67%*** -1.12%*** -0.68%*** 0.32%$ 1.54% 0.66% 0.27% 0.29% 
         
  Buy Sample Sell Sample 
 Director Buy (-20,-1)  Buy (-10,-1)  Buy (-5,-1) Buy(-1,0) Sell(-20,-1) Sell(-10,-1) Sell (-5,-1) Sell(-1,0) 
Male Executive -3.61%*** -2.11%*** -1.17%*** 0.27%*** 2.51%*** 1.49%*** 0.74%*** 0.01% 
Male Nonexecutive -2.43%*** -1.32%*** -0.55%*** 0.31%*** 2.48%*** 1.46%*** 0.77%*** -0.07% 
Female Executive -1.82%* -1.19%* -0.73%* 0.53%* 0.82% -0.04% -0.05% 0.20% 
Female Nonexecutive -1.58%** -1.08%** -0.65%** 0.19% 3.14% 2.20% 0.98% 0.51% 
         
  Buy Sample Sell Sample 
 Director Buy (1,20)  Buy (1,10)  Buy (1,5) Buy(0,1) Sell (1,20)  Sell (1,10)  Sell (1,5) Sell(0,1) 
Executive 0.45%*** 0.66%*** 0.59%*** 0.78%*** -0.71%*** -0.48%*** -0.31%*** -0.23%*** 
Non Executive 0.34%*** 0.47%*** 0.41%*** 0.53%*** -0.75%** -0.50%** -0.25%* -0.27%*** 
Male 0.42%*** 0.63%*** 0.56%*** 0.73%*** -0.73%*** -0.50%*** -0.29%*** -0.25%*** 
Female 0.67%** 0.44%* 0.32%$ 0.53%*** -0.10% -0.13% -0.07% -0.06% 
         
  Buy Sample Sell Sample 
 Director Buy (1,20)  Buy (1,10)  Buy (1,5) Buy(0,1) Sell (1,20)  Sell (1,10)  Sell (1,5) Sell(0,1) 
Male Executive 0.45%*** 0.67%*** 0.61%*** 0.78%*** -0.73%*** -0.52%*** -0.33%*** -0.23%*** 
Male Nonexecutive 0.34%*** 0.48%*** 0.42%*** 0.54%*** -0.75%** -0.48%** -0.23%$ -0.27%*** 
Female Executive 0.85%** 0.86%** 0.45%* 0.71%** 0.37% 0.59% 0.51% 0.09% 
Female Nonexecutive 0.58%$ 0.20% 0.19% 0.43%** -1.16% -1.75% -1.34% -0.37% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
